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SPORTS LAW: ANTITRUST SUIT FAILS TO KNOCK OFF
NBA'S SALARY CAP
Philadelphia 76ers rookie guard Leon Wood "shot an air ball" in his
1984 antitrust suit to bar the National Basketball Association ("NBA")
from enforcing its "salary cap" rules. These rules limit the amount a
team can spend on players' salaries. In Wood v. National Basketball As-
sociation,' a federal district court in New York denied Wood's motion for
a preliminary injunction, holding that the NBA's maximum salary cap
and college draft provisions "come under the protective shield of our
national labor policy and are exempt from the reach of the Sherman
Act."2 Judge Carter, writing for the court, also ruled that the league's
ban on player corporations presented no antitrust issues.3 The judge also
found no showing of irreparable injury to justify injunctive relief.
In 1983, the NBA and the Players Association negotiated a new
modification of an earlier collective bargaining agreement (modified Rob-
ertson agreement).4 The main component of the 1983 modification was
the "salary cap," which instituted a maximum and minimum team salary
limitation with certain exceptions.5 These exceptions permit teams at or
over the maximum salary level to enter into one-year contracts with their
draft selections, but only at the minimum wage set by the collective bar-
gaining agreement.6 The modified Robertson agreement also allows
teams at or above the salary cap limitation to replace a player who retires
or fails to make the team with a new player. The new player's salary can
be as much as half the salary of the player being replaced. Another ex-
ception permits teams at or above the salary cap to replace a player who
1. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
2. Id. at 528.
3. Id. at 529.
4. The original Robertson agreement received court approval in Robertson v. National
Basketball Association, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affTd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
5. National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement (as modified by
Memorandum of Understanding), signed on April 18, 1983 and court approved on June 13,
1984, Art. III [Memorandum of Understanding hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
6. While this case was pending, the 76ers and Wood reached an agreement whereby the
76ers found a way around the salary cap to sign Wood to a four-year contract worth an esti-
mated $1.1 million. The 76ers accomplished this by "trad[ing] Leo Rautins, and his $155,000
salary, to the Indiana Pacers; and the 76ers did not re-sign veteran free agent Franklin Ed-
wards, whose salary had been $126,000. The 76ers thus freed up $281,000 to pay Mr. Wood
(and another player) during.the 1984-85 season." Sobel, Playing with the NBA Salary Cap, 6
Ent. L. Rep. No. 11 at 5 (April 1985). Four 76ers became free agents at the conclusion of the
1984-85 season. Their salaries can be used to pay Leon Wood for the term of his contract, even
if these free agents are re-signed. Id.
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is traded, or a veteran free agent who is not re-signed, with a new player
whose salary does not exceed that of the player being replaced. Finally,
teams at or above the salary cap may re-sign their own veteran free
agents without regard to the salary cap.7
The rationale for imposing a salary cap was to restrict the free-
spending, and in many cases, affluent teams from buying up the top free
agents, or from purchasing the star players from less financially secure
teams.' Under the modified Robertson agreement, which took effect dur-
ing the 1984-85 season, team salary payments were limited to the greater
of either a fixed sum of $3.6 million, or fifty-three percent of the total
NBA gross revenues9 divided by the twenty-three teams in the league."0
During the 1985-86 season, the salary limit per team was $3.8 million
and will rise to $4.0 million for the 1986-87 basketball season. 1
The 1983 modified Robertson agreement between the NBA and the
Players Association provided that those teams currently exceeding the
maximum level would be frozen at their existing levels. The 76ers were
one of the teams that exceeded the $3.6 million salary limitation. The
1983 agreement provided that a team in the 76ers' financial position
would be permitted to enter into a one-year contract with its draft
choices, but only at the $75,000 minimum wage.' 2 This modified Robert-
son agreement received court approval on June 13, 1983. The court con-
cluded that the new agreement between the NBA and the Players
Association was fair, reasonable and adequate.'
3
Once a team drafts a player, it has an exclusive right to contract
with him. Furthermore, the right to negotiate with the player is perpet-
ual. Although frequently criticized as unfairly limiting an athlete's bar-
gaining power, the NBA justifies its draft system as a necessary means to
create and maintain a competitive balance in the league, and insure the
financial stability of all the teams in the NBA. 4
Leon Wood, a gifted basketball player from California State Univer-
sity, Fullerton, and a member of the United States's 1984 gold medal
7. Memorandum at Art. III(C)(2).
8. To date, professional basketball is the only professional sport which has imposed a
salary restriction on its member teams.
9. Memorandum at Art. III(C)(5)(a).
10. Id. at Art. III(C)(l).
It. Id. at Art. III(C)(1)(a).
12. Id. Unfortunately, this $75,000 "minimum wage" is not found in any other profession.
13. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
14. Despite the drafting system, it may be argued that parity among the teams has not
been achieved. For example, for the past six years, three NBA teams (Boston Celtics, Phila-
delphia 76ers, and Los Angeles Lakers) have dominated league play.
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winning Olympic basketball team, was selected by the Philadelphia 76ers
Basketball Club in the first round of the NBA annual college draft on
June 19, 1984. Shortly thereafter, the 76ers and Fred L. Slaughter,
Wood's representative, began contract negotiations.I5 Although the par-
ties were unable to reach an agreement, the 76ers offered Wood a one-
year contract worth $75,000, the minimum wage for a first-round draft
selection. 16 This offer preserved Philadelphia's exclusive right to negoti-
ate with Wood, which was guaranteed under NBA regulations. Wood
rejected the 76ers' offer, and subsequently filed suit against the NBA,
alleging that the NBA's college draft system, the maximum team salary
rules, and the ban on player corporations contained in the collective bar-
gaining agreement constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.17 Wood sought a preliminary injunction and requested
that the 76ers be ordered to negotiate with him without regard to the
restrictions of the college draft, the salary cap rules, and the ban on
player corporations.
A major focus of the Wood decision was directed toward the NBA
draft, the system by which new players are allocated among the existing
teams. The basic purpose of the draft is to disperse the playing talent
among all the teams in the league. The selection process is structured to
enable the least successful teams to secure the best of the new talent en-
tering the league. Thus, player selections from the draft pool are made in
the reverse order of the team's standing in the league at the end of the
season. 18
In Wood, the court rejected Leon Wood's claim that the college
draft system and the salary cap rules contained in the collective bargain-
ing agreement violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court held that
the college draft and the salary cap were exempt from the Sherman
Act. 9 Referring to the three-pronged test for a nonstatutory labor ex-
15. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 529.
16. This issue was disputed at the trial. Patrick Williams, Vice-President and General
Manager of the Philadelphia 76ers, stated in his affidavit that the contract was offered to Wood
only to preserve the team's exclusive right to negotiate with Wood, and was not related to the
NBA's 1983 team salary limitations. Id. at 526-27.
17. Id. at 526, (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). This section declared illegal "[e]very con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade."
18. This system was changed in 1985. Presently, instead of the traditional coin toss be-
tween the teams with the worst record in each conference, the seven teams failing to qualify for
post-season play enter a lottery drawing. Seven cards are then placed in a cylinder. Each card
has the name of one of the seven teams. The Commissioner of the NBA then randomly selects
one card at a time from the cylinder. The team that is selected first receives the seventh draft
selection. The next team selected receives the sixth pick and so on until the final team is
selected. This team receives the first pick in the draft.
19. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
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emption laid out in Mackey v. National Football League,2" the Wood
court stated that conduct which restrains trade may nevertheless be ex-
empt from antitrust laws where: 1) the restraint primarily affects only
the parties to the collective bargaining relationship; 2) the restraint is
over a mandatory subject of bargaining; and 3) the agreement is the
product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. The court held that the
provisions contained in the 1983 collective bargaining agreement reached
between the NBA and the Players Association satisfied the test for a non-
statutory labor exemption articulated in Mackey. In Mackey, the court
noted that "under the general principles surrounding the labor exemp-
tion, the availability of the nonstatutory exemption for a particular agree-
ment turns on whether the relevant federal labor policy is deserving of
pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under the circumstances of the
particular case. Since the three-pronged Mackey test was satisfied in
Wood, the provisions contained in the 1983 collective bargaining agree-
ment were afforded the nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust
laws.
The concept of a labor exemption from the antitrust laws finds its
basic source in sections 622 and 2023 of the Clayton Act and in sections
104, 105 and 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2 4 Those provisions state
20. 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
21. Id. at 613.
22. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that the
antitrust laws do not "forbid the existence and operation of labor . ..organizations" and
labor organizations and their members shall not "be held or construed to be illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws."
23. Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides that:
[n]o restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, . . . involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a prop-
erty right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate
remedy at law ....
24. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, 73, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (1982). Section
104 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that:
[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute . .. from doing . ..any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to
perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; (b) Becoming or
remaining a member of any labor organization, or of any employer organization,
regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 [nonen-
forceability of undertakings in conflict with public policy; "yellow dog" contracts] of
this title; ...
Section 105 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states that:
[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons partici-
pating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful corn-
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that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, and specifically exempt certain union activities such as secondary
picketing and group boycotts from the coverage of antitrust laws.25 This
statutory labor exemption was created to insulate, and thereby protect,
legitimate collective activity by employees,2 6 which although inherently
anticompetitive, is favored by federal labor policy over federal antitrust
laws.2"
The United States Supreme Court, in Connell Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters,2 s held that in order to accommodate the two contrasting
congressional policies of favoring free competition in business markets
and favoring collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act,2 9 certain union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited
nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.3 °
In challenging the maximum team salary limitations and the college
draft system as violative of federal antitrust laws, Wood contended that
since he was not an NBA player when the collective bargaining agree-
ment was negotiated, the agreement could not bind him.
Addressing this argument, the court focused upon the United States
bination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in
section 104 of this title.
Section 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states that:
(a) [a] case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or
have direct, or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer;
or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or em-
ployees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations
of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between
one or more employers or association of employers; or (3) between one or more em-
ployees or associations of employees and one or more employees and associations of
employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "la-
bor dispute" .. .of "persons participating or interested" therein...
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in
a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the
same industry therein, or is a member, officer or agent of any association composed
in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft
or occupation.
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee ...
25. See Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975).
26. The non-labor group (in this case the NBA) may avail itself of the labor exemption as
well. See Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965).
27. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
28. Id. at 616.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
30. Connell 421 U.S. at 622.
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Supreme Court's decision in J.. Case Co. v. NLRB.3" In that case, an
employee was hired after the collective bargaining agreement was made.
The Court held that "the terms of the [employee's] employment already
have been traded out."3 2 Judge Carter stated that according to the hold-
ing in J.. Case, "at the time an agreement is signed between the owners'
and the players' exclusive bargaining representative, all players within
the bargaining unit and those who enter the bargaining unit during the
life of the agreement are bound by its terms."33 The collective bargaining
agreement in question expires on June 1, 1987, and therefore all players
who enter the NBA up to that date are bound under the 1983 modified
Robertson collective bargaining agreement, including Leon Wood. Thus,
the first of three prerequisites for a nonstatutory labor exemption from
the Sherman Antitrust Act was satisfied.
The second requirement for a nonstatutory labor exemption from
the Sherman Act is that the restraint on trade must involve a mandatory
subject of the bargaining agreement. In the case of NLRB v. Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corp. , the Supreme Court stated: "the duty to
bargain is limited to mandatory subjects and within that area neither
party is legally obligated to yield. As to other matters, however, each
party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and [to] agree or not to
agree. ' '35 In defining the duty of each party to bargain, the subject mat-
ter of the bargaining has been classified into two basic categories:
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. Citing the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Wooster, the Wood court stated that the mandatory
subjects of bargaining included "wages, hours and other terms and con-
ditions of employment,, 36 while permissive subjects of bargaining in-
cluded all other matters. Parties are required to bargain in good faith
about mandatory subjects, but may refuse to bargain about permissive
subjects.37 In addition, a party may insist that the other agree to propos-
als with respect to mandatory subjects even to the point of impasse.38
Since the college draft provisions and salary cap limitations contained in
the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the Players
31. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
32. Id. at 335.
33. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 529.
34. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
35. Id. at 349.
36. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
37. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 399 (2d ed. 1976).
38. "Impasse" may be defined as "that point at which the parties have exhausted the pros-
pects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless." Id. at 448.
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Association fall within the definition of wages and terms and conditions
of employment, they are considered mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The third and final requirement for a nonstatutory labor exemption
was that the collective bargaining agreement must be the product of bona
fide arm's length bargaining. Simply stated, an agreement which is nego-
tiated at arm's length is one which is negotiated by unrelated parties,
each acting in its own self-interest. Since the parties to the NBA collec-
tive bargaining agreement were unrelated and acting in their own self-
interests, the Wood court held that the NBA collective bargaining agree-
ment was the product of bona fide arm's length negotiating. 39 The court
thus concluded that Leon Wood's claim that the college draft system and
the maximum salary limitation violated existing antitrust laws must fail,
because the collective bargaining agreement reached between the NBA
and the Players Association met the Mackey test for a nonstatutory ex-
emption from the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Finally, the Wood court discussed the player corporation ban. The
player corporation or personal service corporation refers to a "corpora-
tion that is organized for the purpose of utilizing the individual's athletic,
or other, abilities."' The personal service corporation permits an indi-
vidual to defer his income by use of corporate pension and profit-sharing
plans, adopt corporate fringe benefit programs, and qualify for estate
planning advantages offered by the corporate form of organization.4 The
1983 NBA collective bargaining agreement contained a ban on player
corporations. According to the Players Association General Counsel,
the ban on player corporations was agreed to because "these individual
corporations created administrative entanglements and accounting diffi-
culties for the benefit plans established by the Players Association and
the NBA."'42 The court concluded that since the ban potentially affects
the terms and conditions of employment, it could be considered a
mandatory subject of bargaining.4 3 However, even if the ban on player
corporations could not be classified as a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the court concluded that the ban presented no antitrust issues.4 It was
merely a restriction agreed upon by both parties to the agreement for
general convenience. Therefore, Leon Wood could not successfully al-
lege antitrust violations regarding the player corporation ban.
39. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
40. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORrs 880-81 (1979).
41. Id.
42. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 529.
43. Id. The court did not explain how the ban potentially affects the terms and conditions
of employment.
44. Id.
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In his suit, Leon Wood sought a grant for preliminary injunctive
relief. In the Second Circuit, for a plaintiff to prevail in this type of ac-
tion, he must show an "unequivocal establishment of irreparable injury
and either (1) the likelihood of success on the merits [of the case] or (2)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits [of the case] to make
them a fair ground for litigation and the balance of hardships tipping in
favor of the party seeking relief."45 The court held that Wood could not
meet these standards, as there was no "likelihood of [Wood] succeeding
on the merits or of showing that he has raised serious questions to war-
rant their being tested in further litigation."'4 6 In addition, the court
ruled that Wood failed to show any irreparable harm; he only claimed
that he was being underpaid. This was far from a showing of irreparable
harm, as money damages would sufficiently compensate him for
whatever injury he had suffered.47 Since irreparable harm could not be
shown, the court denied Wood's motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
To date, Wood v. National Basketball Association has not been cited
by other courts. At first glance, it appears doubtful that Wood will ever
become a landmark case within the sports law field. It is a case which
seemingly raises few, if any, new or unique issues. As Judge Carter
stated, "to adopt plaintiff's principle would turn federal labor policy on
its head."4 If Leon Wood had prevailed in this case, the courts could
become inundated with an influx of litigation: employees hired after the
terms of collective bargaining agreements were negotiated by their em-
ployers and unions would challenge the agreements' terms as non-bind-
ing on themselves.
A more detailed examination of the Wood case reveals one astonish-
ing fact: the Players Association agreed to a restriction on the salaries of
the NBA players. The question which immediately comes to mind is,
does the Players Association's acquiescence to player restraints such as
the salary cap and college draft violate its duty of fair representation49 to
the players? This question must be answered in the negative. The Play-
ers Association has a duty to act in the best interests of all the players,
not just the relatively small number of superstars in the league. The sal-
ary cap achieves this goal by providing a minimum salary which benefits
a large percentage of the NBA players.
45. Id., citing Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood and Sons, 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
46. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 529.
47. Id. at 530.
48. Id.
49. See generally GORMAN at 695-728 for an explanation of a union's duty of fair represen-
tation to its members.
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Arguably, public policy favors the imposition of the salary cap in
professional basketball. Many sports fans have great difficulty sympa-
thizing with athletes in a sport where the average salary is approximately
$300,000 per year.5" Absent a salary restriction, there is the potential for
a few teams to purchase the top players and dominate league play. The
result of this could be an erosion of fan interest leading to the financial
demise of the game. The college draft system and salary cap limitation
are attempts to evenly distribute talent throughout the league, thus af-
fording each franchise financial security.
It may be argued that professional sports should be treated like any
other business and therefore should not be able to claim an exemption
from antitrust laws. However, the realities of the professional sports
world can be quite different from the realities of the business world. It
should be emphasized that teams within a league differ from businesses
which compete against one another in other industries. A business firm
normally seeks to sell as much of its product as it can and is typically
indifferent whether, in so doing, it drives its competition out of business.
Conversely, a professional sports team is vitally concerned about the fi-
nancial well-being of the other teams in the league. By the very nature of
professional sports, it is not possible for a particular sport to survive un-
less the majority of the teams in that sport are successful, as there is an
interdependence among the teams.
Is there any way to please both the owners and the players? The
modified Robertson agreement appears to accomplish this seemingly im-
possible task, a view supported by the affidavit of Russell T. Granik, Ex-
ecutive Vice-President of the National Basketball Association.5"
Although the salary cap may affect the freedom of individual player con-
tract negotiations, the players in return secured a number of important
benefits. By agreeing to a limitation on the amount that can be spent for
players' salaries, the players materially improved the prospects of the
league's financial survival, thereby protecting against the loss of jobs for
all NBA players and reducing the risk of failure of teams to meet de-
ferred obligations of retired players. In exchange for the players' agree-
ment to a maximum team salary, the players gained a minimum team
salary that results in the unprecedented right to a guaranteed fifty-three
percent share of projected league gross revenues for the upcoming sea-
50. This approximation was arrived at by dividing the allowable team salary limitation by
the twelve members on each team ($3.6 million divided by 12 equals approximately $300,000
per player per year).
51. Affidavit of Russell T. Granik, Executive Vice-President of the National Basketball
Association (Sept. 21, 1984) (unpublished document).
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son. Furthermore, by reason of the guaranteed percentage, the players
secured the right to share in the future financial growth of the NBA.52
The benefits achieved by the players must also be viewed against the
background of the severe financial hardship faced by the NBA. During
the seven years in which the Robertson agreement53 had been in effect
before its modification, the great majority of NBA teams lost money.54
Players' salaries and benefits, the largest expense items of the league, 5
rose steadily, fueled by the record salary levels being offered and paid to
veteran free agents.56 This trend made it increasingly difficult for teams
in the smaller markets to retain some of their most talented players, re-
sulting in growing competitive imbalance among NBA teams.57 This in
turn led to a decrease in the perceived value of NBA franchises, and
seriously eroded buyer interest in small market franchises.5 "
Mr. Granik stated in his affidavit that:
[t]o address these problems, the NBA believed that some mech-
anism was required to allow teams to project future profitability
based upon manageable expenses and to enhance their ability to
compete for the services of the most talented players. The pro-
visions of the Memorandum of Understanding and Modifica-
tion Agreement were designed to promote those ends.59
The modified Robertson agreement will not dispose of all of the
problems encountered by the NBA. Its intended result is to guarantee
the financial security and stability of the league. The salary cap provision
protects the owners from other free-spending owners. Under the salary
cap provision, the owners are limited in the amount that each may pay a
team's twelve members. The salary cap regulation also provides a salary
floor (fifty-three percent of the NBA projected gross revenues), which
assures financial security to all NBA players. Therefore, both the owners
and the players derive a direct benefit from the salary cap provisions con-
tained in the modified Robertson agreement.
Although Leon Wood may have "shot an air ball" in his 1984 anti-
52. Id.
53. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), alffd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
54. Affidavit of Russell T. Granik, Executive Vice-President of the National Basketball
Association (Sept. 21, 1984) (unpublished document).
55. Id.
56. For example, between 1981 and 1984, the average NBA salary escalated from
$175,000 to nearly $350,000. Sobel, Playing With the NBA Salary Cap, 6 Ent. L. Rep. No. II
at 4 (April 1985).
57. Affidavit of Russell T. Granik, Executive Vice-President of the National Basketball
Association (Sept. 21, 1984) (unpublished document).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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trust action to bar the National Basketball Association from enforcing its
salary cap rules, his suit may serve as a means of sensitizing the owners
and the players to the necessity of these rules and the beneficial effects
the salary cap rules will have for both owners and players. Conceivably,
Leon Wood's "air ball" could become a "three-point play!"'
Lloyd C. Bronstein
60. On Jan. 10, 1986, Leon Wood was traded from the Philadelphia 76ers to the Washing-
ton Bullets in exchange for rookie forward Kenny Green.
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